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 Constitutions as Communication 
1. Introduction 
How can we adapt our conceptions of constitutions to an increasingly globalised world and a 
fragmented national polity?  This is particularly important in the context of economic 
management, given that globalisation is primarily (though not exclusively) a matter of the 
organisation of international and national economies.  One response is through constitutional 
pluralism, positing the existence of a plurality of constitutions at international, national and 
sectoral levels.    The result might, of course, be greatly increased conflict between different 
levels and forms of constitution, thus making policy coordination impossible, and perhaps 
ceding organisational responsibility to the market rather than to law or politics.  An 
alternative, however, is that we can see this proliferation of different constitutional forms as 
providing opportunities for new means of coordination and communication between different 
types and levels of constitution and government and between law and other social systems.  
This article will examine some possibilities for this approach by examining the potential role 
of social theory in suggesting structured institutional and procedural means to achieve 
communicative goals in the area of economic management, illustrating this with four brief 
case studies. 
 
2.  Constitutional pluralism 
Constitutional pluralism may take a number of forms.  In the area of economic management, 
at a minimum we need to add to the national constitution the different, and contested, 
European constitutions, and also other forms of international constitutions which have a 
major effect on national economies.  These give us our first sense of constitutional pluralism, 
concerned with multi-level constitutional governance at the domestic and international levels.  
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Apart from the EU, the most well-known example is that of the World Trade Organisation.4  
Even trade treaties may have major effects in constituting national governments’ ability to 
engage in economic management and regulation; the current negotiations between the EU 
and the USA on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership provide a particularly 
important example.  In order to recognise effectively the role of such international 
constitutional regimes, the concept of legal pluralism has been particularly fruitful, most 
notably in the work of Neil Walker, which deals in a sophisticated way with the interaction of 
national and trans-national, especially EU, constitutional models.5  
However, the plurality of constitutions in economic management is not limited to 
those of an international or transnational character, for it is possible also to detect competing 
constitutional models within national constitutions.  For example, in the UK there has been 
much discussion of the relationship between the ‘legal’ and the ‘political’ constitutions; 
although it is an old debate, it has been given particular force by the passing of the Human 
Rights Act and the resulting high profile decisions of the courts applying it.7  This debate, 
                                                 
4 For discussion of its constitutional status see e.g. the essays in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL 
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds, 2011); cf  DEBORAH CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING SYSTEM esp. 32-8, 132, 143-4, 22-4 (2005). 
5 See e.g. Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MODERN LAW REVIEW, 317 (2002); 
Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal Authority in Europe in 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY (Gràinne de Búrca 
and Joanne Scott eds, 2000), 9-30; Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder 
of Normative Orders, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 373 (2008). 
7 For an overview see Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, What is a Political Constitution?, 30 OXFORD 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 273 (2010). 
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however, is already somewhat passé and it is heartening that any such bipolar view of the UK 
constitution is now rejected by recent commentators.  For example, Gee and Webber consider 
that ‘Britain’s constitution is no longer – and likely never was – premised on any one 
constitutional model, whether this be a political or a legal or some other model.  Rather, we 
are now better placed to recognize that Britain’s constitution today embraces, perhaps in 
uncertain ways and to an uncertain extent, both a political model and a legal model.’8 
At best, the ideas of the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ constitution can be used as ideal types, or 
models, for comparative constitutional analysis, or, as is the case in much of the literature, as 
indicators of changes over time. 
In fact, the mix of different constitutional models is far more complex than the 
‘political’ and ‘legal’ models allow.  Another, which will be of great importance for later 
discussion, is that of the ‘administrative constitution’ operating through informal and internal 
rules and controls, identified by Daintith and Page as a central constitutional feature of the 
UK specifically in areas of economic management and the control of public expenditure.10  
The interactions of these different types of constitutional organisation and supervision give us 
our second sense of legal pluralism. 
More radically, Gunther Teubner has pointed to the development of sub-constitutions 
within different sectors of the welfare state; these ‘sectoral constitutions’ ‘allow different 
areas of society a constitutionalization of their own, creating a precarious balance between 
their constitutional autonomy and the political constitutional interventions.’11  This gives us a 
                                                 
8 Ibid 292. 
10 TERENCE DAINTITH & ALAN PAGE, THE EXECUTIVE IN THE CONSTITUTION: STRUCTURE, 
AUTONOMY AND INTERNAL CONTROL 17-19, 392-8 (1999). 
11 GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETY CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION, 30 (2012), 30. 
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third sense of constitutional pluralism, in which it makes sense to talk of, and to contrast, 
different sectoral constitutions.  Examples would be the fiscal constitution, the constitution of 
monetary policy and the constitution of markets through competition law. 
The profusion of normative arrangements associated with constitutional pluralism, 
however, creates both practical and theoretical difficulties.12   In practical terms, it might 
appear a recipe for chaos and mutually contradictory norms based on constitutional 
arrangements which guard their own autonomy and lack reflexivity and coordination.  As an 
approach to legal theory, it has been criticised as a misreading of the essence of a 
constitution, confusing the sociology of how power is exercised in practice with the legal 
issue of authority.13  In this article I shall suggest social theory can provide the basis for 
organised forms of communication as a constitutional technique for overcoming the problems 
of constitutional pluralism, and shall illustrate successful and unsuccessful attempts to do so.  
First I shall clear the ground by discussing some other potential constitutional solutions to the 
issues I have raised, and in doing so clarify and distinguish my own arguments. 
 
3. Precommitments and experimentalism 
Constitutions will have a dual role in dealing with the complexity caused by the profusion of 
normative systems under constitutional pluralism; they will act both as constraints and 
facilitators.  Constitutions may be a means of precommitment by limiting the range of 
                                                 
12 See Gunther Teubner, Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses in LAW, SOCIETY AND 
ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 1885 – 1995 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997), 149, esp. at 157. 
13 See Martin Loughlin’s critique of constitutional pluralism; Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?, 3 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 (2014). 
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different policy choices available to a majority and putting some questions beyond debate.  
For example, this may be intended to ensure that the interests of future generations are taken 
into account; what is termed by Elster ‘constitutions as constraints’.20  The key issue will be 
the balance between such precommitments and those questions left open to ordinary politics.  
Some precommitments may be substantive, and of course are a common feature of many 
constitutions in order to protect fundamental rights; one thinks immediately of the unalterable 
fundamental rights under the German Basic Law.21  These rights may include those necessary 
for the operation of an economic system, for example qualified rights to property and to 
freedom of contract.  However, such substantive precommitments are much less appropriate 
in relation to the substance of economic management, a point acknowledged by Elster 
himself, because of their inflexibility and the especially intense conflict between 
precommitment and democratic choice in this area, particularly where constitutional 
amendment is difficult or involves lengthy and cumbersome procedures.22  Nevertheless, 
there have been those who advocate the use of constitutional rules of substance here, for 
example in ordoliberalism or constitutional economics.23  The latter has been strongly 
                                                 
20 See in particular JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, Ch. II (2000); for a succinct summary of the 
arguments see also Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (John Elster & Rune Slagsted eds, 1988), 195. 
21 ULYSSES UNBOUND, 102. 
22 ULYSSES UNBOUND, 162-7. 
23 For a critique see TEUBNER, CONSTITUIONAL FRAGMENTS, n 11 above, 30-34. 
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associated with the advocacy of a balanced budget rule.24  In my first case study below I shall 
suggest that this approach suffers from two major defects; that it artificially narrows political 
choice, and neglects difficulties of communication between legal, political and economic 
systems.  That case study will also show the difficulty of enforcing such a rule at a trans-
national level. 
The alternative would be to adopt an approach based on procedural precommitments.  
There are many variants of this; one model for an appropriate balance between 
precommitment and openness comes from liberal theory drawing inspiration from Rawls, in 
which a constitution is based on the principle of equal participation through fair rivalry for 
political office and authority.25  It represents a rejection of a view of constitutions as 
implementing a comprehensive programme of substantive justice but instead sees them as 
creating the rights necessary for political participation.26  Such an approach would seem to 
avoid the difficulties of the substantive precommitments discussed above through retaining 
the essential openness of choice in how the economy is managed.  It has, however, faced 
criticism from writers associated with Republican theory, exemplified by Michael Sandel’s 
                                                 
24 JAMES BUCHANAN AND RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL 
LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977): JAMES BUCHANAN, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying 
the Arguments, 90 PUBLIC CHOICE, 117 (1997). 
25 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 194-206 (revised ed., 1999).  See also Roberto Garganella, The 
Constitution and Justice in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, eds, 2012). 
26 The Constitution and Justice, ibid, 338. 
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critique of what he terms ‘the constitution of the procedural republic’.  This procedural 
account of the constitution maintains that ‘government should not affirm in law any particular 
version of the good life.  Instead it should provide a framework of rights that respects persons 
as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own values and ends’.27 This 
neutrality, Sandel argues, has the cost that, instead of a culture based on learning and the 
cultivation of civic virtue, there is an unprincipled economic pluralism in which those 
problems which cannot be solved by the operation of markets supplying given consumer 
preferences are treated as susceptible to technical rather than political or moral resolution; an 
‘evacuation of the public sphere’.28  If the use of strong substantive constraints is an example 
of economic imperialism,29 the liberal model sets up too rigid a division between the realm of 
constitutional procedure and civil society. 
This critique would suggest that it is desirable to have a different relationship between 
normative precommitment and democratic openness in our approach to constitutions and 
economic management.  Whilst rejecting substantive precommitments on economic choices, 
we should accept that the pluralism of the economic and political marketplace will not be 
enough to found effective social learning.  To facilitate this we should adopt a different form 
of precommitment, one which specifies the conditions by which communication can be 
                                                 
27 MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, 4; see also The Constitution of the Procedural 
Republic: Liberal Rights and Civil Virtues, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1997-1998). 
28 The Constitution of the Procedural Republic, ibid, 10-11, 13. 
29 TEUBNER, CONSTITUITONAL FRAGMENTS, n 11 above, 33. 
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channelled and shaped; in this sense we need procedures which are both liberating and 
constraining. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from precommitment, an influential approach for 
dealing with complexity in administrative law has been that of the ‘democratic 
experimentalism’ and ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ associated with Charles Sabel and his 
collaborators, and applied, for example, to US constitutional arrangements and the emerging 
architecture of EU rule-making.30  The underlying philosophy is derived from Dewey’s 
pragmatism, and advocates a constitution in which ‘power is decentralized  to enable citizens 
and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual 
circumstances, but in which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share 
their knowledge with others facing similar problems’. 31  The decentralisation is both 
fragmenting and destabilizing.32  The emphasis on novel forms of institutional 
communication as a source of learning in this work is attractive, but such a wholesale 
programme of decentralisation and increased institutional fragmentation or destabilisation 
would not resolve the problems of integration characteristic of constitutional pluralism and 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: 
The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 271 
(2008). 
31 A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, ibid., 267. 
32 A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, ibid., 340; Learning from Difference n 30 above, 313. 
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noted above; nor would it necessarily meet the criticisms made by Republican theory through 
promoting learning processes and civic debate.  As Black has argued in her seminal critique 
of proceduralisation in regulation, it is possible to go beyond a ‘thin’ conception of 
proceduralisation aimed at bargaining and compromise; instead, as the Republicans 
advocated, procedures can facilitate ‘the mutuality, consensus and inter-subjective 
understanding of deliberative democracy’; a ‘thick’ conception.  This requires not simply 
open procedures to accept inputs, but demanding conditions relating to the channelling and 
shaping of information in line with broader constitutional values and integrating it with inputs 
from other sources.33  As a sympathetic critic of experimentalism has put it, ‘[o]nly because it 
is possible for the various actors to understand themselves as partners in a shared enterprise, 
which is grounded in and constrained by reference to shared constitutional principles, is it 
possible to establish the presupposition-rich processes that experimentalism describes.’34 
I shall suggest that such a communicative approach does preserve the openness of 
economic management required by democratic ideals, whilst at the same time providing a 
response to the Republican critiques of liberal theory by setting demanding conditions for 
                                                 
33 Julia Black, Proceduralizing Regulation, Part I 20 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 597-614 (2000) and 
Part II 21 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 33-58 (2001), esp. at 599, and for the need for ‘translation’ and 
other aspects of institutionalisation, 47-57; for a similar critique see J. Lenoble and M. Maesschalck, Reviewing 
the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance in 
LENOBLE AND MAESSCHALK, eds, REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE: REDEFINING THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD, 3 (2010). 
34 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constitutionalism and Experimentalist Governance, 6 REGULATION AND 
GOVERNANCE 402 (2012). 
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testing normative and empirical claims through discourse.  Its philosophical base does not 
come from ‘the pragmatist account of thought and action as problem solving in a world, 
familiar to our time, that is bereft of first principles and beset by unintended consequences, 
ambiguities and difference’.35  Instead, it adopts a Habermasian concern with the necessary 
conditions for social discourse.  This means that alongside the openness it provides 
constraint, not through rules outlawing particular options but through specifying strong 
conditions for identifying the most appropriate outcomes from conflicting demands and 
values. On this approach, it is not particular substantive choices which are put beyond debate, 
but those influences and pressures which may distort communication itself.  These conditions 
are will be discussed in the first part of the next section, and my third case study will 
illustrate one means by which they can be judicially enforced. 
I shall also try to counter a further criticism of procedural approaches; that they 
assume too easily that there is a common language of inputs from different social systems 
which can simply be aggregated in procedural fora.  As has been pointed out in systems 
theory, especially in the work on autopoiesis, there may be elemental blocks in 
communication between different systems such as law, politics and economics, which makes 
the direct drawing of common conclusions from a mix of systems impossible.  The second of 
my case studies will illustrate precisely this from the management of financial crisis in the 
UK.  I shall however, suggest that, rather than treating communication between legal, 
                                                 
35 A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, n. 30 above, 284. 
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political and economic systems as impossible, institutional arrangements may be designed to 
facilitate it, a point also made in depth by Black.36  This can be done through the careful 
design of a pluralistic set of institutions with countervailing powers, as I shall describe in my 
final case study. 
The essence of the communication I describe in this article is thus that it does not 
attempt directly to outlaw particular politico-economic outcomes by substantive rules, but 
imposes demanding conditions for seeking collaborative solutions, and remains open to the 
incorporation and translation (to use Black’s phrase) of inputs from different social systems.  
In doing so it enriches procedural processes through shaping and channelling these inputs so 
as to enhance both legitimacy and effectiveness.  This can take place both through the design 
of procedures themselves and of the institutions within which they operate.  I shall now turn 
to two bodies of thought in social theory which can provide a basis for such a communicative 
approach. 
 
4.  Social theory and constitutional communication 
An emphasis on constitutions as communication can be grounded in several schools of social 
theory.  An account of them will also provide the opportunity to clarify the different senses in 
which the concept of communication may be used.  The two theoretical approaches addressed 
here each provide different support for the idea of communication.  One is through reference 
to the highly normative concept of democratic participation.  The other is more concerned 
                                                 
36 Proceduralizing Regulation, n 33 above, 46-58 
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with communication as a means of coordination between different systems to ensure that 
governance works effectively, though evidently this also raises normative concerns about the 
criteria to be used in assessing effectiveness. 
 
4.1. Discourse theory 
The first, and most obvious, body of theory is the discursive theory of democracy associated 
in particular with the work of Jürgen Habermas.37  This highly complex theory can only be 
summarised in outline here.38  It is based on a concept of communicative reason derived from 
the essential conditions required for human communication.39  This ‘discourse principle’ is 
based on the claim that ‘the only regulations and ways of acting that can claim legitimacy are 
those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants in rational 
discourses.’40 
For our purposes, two implications of this theory are of particular importance.  The 
first is that it produces a theory of rights, rights which are necessary to make political 
communication possible.  The interest of the theory here is that, rather than inherent natural 
rights preceding political arrangements and political communication, they are required in 
order to make such communication effective through providing the conditions for discourse 
                                                 
37 The fullest statement of this theory is to be found in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996).  A similar, 
and rather more accessible, statement of the theory of deliberative democracy can be found in IRIS MARION. 
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000). 
38 For a concise summary see the Postscript to BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, ibid 447-62. 
39 For fuller discussion of this and the ‘ideal speech situation’ presupposed on communication, see JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981) and for an accessible introduction see 
ROBERT ALEXY, THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL 
DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION ch II (2009). 
40 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 458. 
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between citizens treated as free and equal participants.41  Secondly, constitutions should 
reflect the discourse principle through providing mechanisms for ‘undistorted will-formation’ 
permitting communication undistorted by power.  To summarise; 
[a] legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-original private 
and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time, however, it owes its 
legitimacy to the forms of communication in which alone this autonomy can express 
and prove itself.  In the final analysis, the legitimacy of law depends on undistorted 
forms of public communication and indirectly on the communicational infrastructure 
of the private sphere as well.42 
 
The obvious location for securing legitimacy through public communication would be 
the democratic legislature which remains open to communication from civil society.  
‘Discourses conducted by representatives can meet the condition of equal participation on the 
part of all members only if they remain porous, sensitive and receptive to the suggestions, 
issues and contributions, information and arguments that flow in from a discursively 
structured public sphere, that is, one that is pluralistic, close to the grass roots, and relatively 
undisturbed by the effects of power’.43  In my third case study below I shall discuss an 
attempt to secure the capacity of the legislature to engage in discursive discussion of 
economic management more effectively.  However, decisions relating to economic 
management have increasingly moved away from the legislature to the executive and to 
international organisations.   Habermas has expanded the role of communicative discourse to 
                                                 
41 See especially BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above ch 3. 
42 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 409 (emphasis retained). 
43 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 182. 
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include the process of legal argumentation and also procedures internal to the 
administration.44    Thus 
insofar as the implementation of programmatic goals requires the administration to 
perform organizational tasks that at least implicitly require a further development of 
law, the legitimation basis of traditional administrative structures no longer suffices.  
The logic of the separation of powers must then be realized in new structures, say, by 
setting up the corresponding forms of participation and communication or by 
introducing quasi-judicial and parliamentary procedures, procedures for compromise 
formation, and so on.45 
 
Earlier on I mentioned the important role of the administrative constitution operating 
through internal rules and controls; it is here that proposals to enhance the communicative 
potential of the administration are most relevant.  As we shall see in the final case study, this 
may give a particular constitutional importance to the establishment of countervailing 
administrative institutions and the use of new techniques and procedures associated with 
them. 
                                                 
44 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above ch.5 on legal argumentation and 190-2, 391, 431-6 and 
440-41 on discursive procedures within the administration. 
45 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 193; see also 391, 430-6, 440-1.  A similar point is made by 
Young, n 37 above 45-6. 
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Economic management is in part characterised by processes of bargaining, especially 
in areas of taxation, public expenditure and debt reduction.  This is distinct from value 
oriented or ‘pure’ deliberative discussion in that it is concerned with compromise between 
different interests rather than redefining interests on the basis of values all can accept; thus 
the outcome does not depend solely on the power of the better argument.   As a result, 
[t]he discourse principle, which is supposed to secure an uncoerced consensus, can … 
be brought to bear only indirectly, though procedures that regulate bargaining from 
the standpoint of fairness. … More specifically, the negotiation of compromises 
should follow procedures that provide all the interested parties with an equal 
opportunity for pressure, that is, an equal opportunity to influence one another during 
the actual bargaining, so that all the affected interests can come into play and have 
equal chances of prevailing.  To the extent that these conditions are met, there are 
grounds for presuming that negotiated agreements are fair.46 
This has obvious institutional implications put well by Berman; ‘although people may never 
reach agreement on norms, they may at least acquiesce in procedural mechanisms, 
institutions, or practices that take hybridity seriously, rather than ignoring it through 
assertions of territorially-based power or dissolving it through universalist imperatives.’47 
The concept of communication used in Habermas’s work is a highly normative one, 
though he would claim that its normative claims have a grounding not in a priori principle 
but in the ‘universal pragmatics’ inherent in all communicative acts.49  This normative 
emphasis is not just based on the effectiveness of government but on its potential through 
                                                 
46 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 166-7 (emphasis retained). 
47 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1155, 1164 
(2007). 
49 See notably JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (1979). 
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deliberative democracy to achieve inclusion of citizens in the process of deciding common 
values and fairly allocating resources. As Young has put it, ‘[d]emocratic process is primarily 
a discussion of problems, conflicts, and claims of need and interest. … Participants arrive at a 
decision not by determining what preferences have the greatest numerical support, but by 
determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons.’ 50 
However, communication may also refer to the more abstract question of 
communication between law and other social systems, such as the economic and the political 
systems.  This is also central to Habermas’s work, with his conception of law as a hinge 
between, on the one hand, systems of the economy and administration steered and co-
ordinated by money and power, and, on the other, the ‘lifeworld’ structured through 
communicative interaction.51  One can also find theoretical support for the importance of 
such communication from an unexpected source, that of systems theory, and it is to this that I 
shall now turn. 
 
4.2. Systems theory 
The choice of systems theory as a second basis for a theory of constitution and economic 
management may appear surprising for two reasons.  The first is that theorising on 
communication in the social sciences is associated strongly with the work of Habermas, and 
he is highly critical of many of the pre-suppositions of influential aspects of systems theory, 
for example for marginalising the normative logic of law and the importance of the 
                                                 
50 Young n 37 above 22-3. 
51 For a summary of the distinction see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 1-8 (1976) and in 
relation to law, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 56. 
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communicative life-world.52  However, I shall suggest that this is not a sound criticism of all 
systems theory.  Secondly, some of the most influential systems-theoretical work relating to 
law is best characterised as theory of non-communication, emphasising the inherent limits on 
direct communication between law and other social systems; indeed, the theory of autopoiesis 
has been characterised as in many senses a theory of legal autonomy rather than of direct 
communication.53  This may be true of earlier versions of autopoiesis, in particular the work 
of Luhmann, but is less the case in relation to later versions.54  Here I shall briefly discuss 
selected work of Gunther Teubner on autopoiesis, and then refer to a more recent version of 
systems theory which gives a direct and positive role to the potential of constitutions as 
means of communication. 
In earlier work, like Luhmann, Teubner emphasised the limits of communication 
between law and other social systems, including the economy.55  He takes from Luhmann the 
insistence that systems are ‘operatively closed’ to other systems; in other words, that they 
cannot communicate directly but only indirectly through their ‘cognitive openness’ requiring 
communications to be translated into the codes of the receiving system.  In the case of law, 
the code is the binary one of legal/illegal.  Thus ‘[a]s soon as legal communications on the 
fundamental distinction between legal and illegal begin to be differentiated from general 
social communication, they inevitably become self-referential, and are forced to consider 
                                                 
52 See e.g. his critique of Luhmann in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 47-52.  For a critique of 
Habermas by Teubner see his Altera Pars Audiatur…, n 12 above 162-7. 
53 See Michael King, The “Truth” About Autopoiesis, 20 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 218 (1993). 
54 For a critique of Luhmann’s methodological approach in this context see BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 
n 37 above 47-52. 
55 See in particular How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOCIETY 
REVIEW 727 (1989); LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993). 
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themselves in terms of legal categories. … The law is forced to describe its components using 
its own categories.’56 
However, as Michael King has pointed out, Teubner’s account differs from that of 
Luhmann in accepting a notion of partial autopoiesis.57  First, there is an acceptance that 
some general communication will be internalised in each system, thus creating a bridge with 
the generalised life-world; 
all forms of specialized communication in any social subsystem – interaction, 
organization, functional subsystem – are also at the same time always forms of 
general societal communication. … every specialized legal communication is always 
at the same time an act of general social communication. … The mutual interference 
of systems makes it possible not only for them to observe each other but for there to 
be real communicative contact between the system and the life-world.58 
In a way reminiscent of Habermas’s work, this medium of general communication is located 
in the lifeworld constituted by the structure of meaning through ordinary language.  
According to Habermas, this is incompatible with the conceptualisation of law as an 
autopoietic system.59 
Secondly, law may act as a procedural bridge between systems to render them more 
reflexive.  In more recent work, this medium of general social communication is more closely 
linked to the function of constitutions which perform this role.  Already Teubner’s work had 
suggested a preference for procedural legal solutions; thus the role of law was not to regulate 
other subsystems directly but to ‘further the development of reflexion structures within other 
                                                 
56 LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM, n 55 above 33. 
57 N 53 above 224. 
58 LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM, n 55 above 86, 88. 
59 See Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, n 37 above 52-6, 
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social subsystems.’60  For example, in the context of judicial review of codetermination in 
economic organisations in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court, faced with contending 
arguments about the constitutionality of codetermination based on its socioeconomic effects 
‘[r]efused to take a substantive position on these scenarios about possible consequences and 
resorted to a “procedural” solution.  Instead of confirming or rejecting reality constructions, 
the court allocated risks of information and risks of prediction among the collective actors 
involved, including the court itself, and created a new legal duty for the legislature: to reverse 
its decisions if the predictions on which they were based should turn out to be wrong…’.61 
As we shall see later in this article, similar decisions by the same Court in cases concerned 
with the EU response to the eurozone crisis are particularly good examples of the German 
Constitution being treated as a medium for allocating institutional responsibilities in order to 
avoid blockages to communication. 
This approach is more fully developed in Teubner’s work Constitutional Fragments.  
Thus one role of law is to structure cooperation procedures through constitutionalization; 
‘[c]onstitutions are everywhere in society … Law must accordingly develop a “multilateral 
constitutionalism” that does not bind social orders unilaterally either to the constitution of the 
state or to the economy, but rather models specific constitutions that do justice to the 
peculiarities of the various orders.’62 
According to Teubner, the role of constitutions will not be to impose substantive 
limits on the economic role of the state, as the ordoliberals had suggested and, as we shall see 
later, has also characterised recent attempts to constitutionalise balanced budget rules.  That 
                                                 
60 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 
239, 275 (1983) (emphasis retained). 
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would amount to creating an economic constitution autonomous from politics, and resolving 
conflicts between the economy and politics one-sidedly in favour of the former.63  Nor is the 
role of the constitution directly to implement political goals, as was that of the welfare state 
model of constitutionalism. 
Rather, it concentrates the role of politics on specifying constitutional models for 
social sub-areas so that a close co-operation of state and social actors can be achieved 
to keep in check the centrifugal tendencies of functional differentiation.  The state 
itself is assigned the task of integrating conflicting sub-systems, however, not by 
making collective obligatory judgments, rather by co-ordinating the co-operation of 
public and private organizations.64 
On this model, then, constitutional pluralism is recognised not just at different vertical levels 
(trans-national, national, legal, political, administrative) but in different horizontal sectors 
(economy, politics); one central question is that of communication between them. 
 
This approach differs in important respects from that of Habermas, in particular 
through lacking the highly normative concern with communication as a means of deliberative 
democracy and the development of justified norms.  Thus in the earlier systems theory of 
Luhmann, ‘the problem of justice [was] removed from its old connection with truth and 
justifiability and rather regarded as the question of whether or not the legal system has 
adequate complexity’.65  In Teubner’s more recent work, the role of meta-constitutionalism is 
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to put pressure on the functional systems to develop a stronger regard for the broader social 
environment, with the aim of ‘sustainability’, in the sense of preventing systems damaging 
their environments (in the broad sense of other systems).66  Thus the concern is with 
effectiveness and the limitation of destructive damage to different systems. This raises 
interesting normative questions on the meaning of effectiveness, but does not have the 
underlying thrust of discursive democracy found in Habermas’s work. 
Some important insights on the role of constitutions from a different version of 
systems theory have been provided in the recent work of the British social theorist Frank 
Vibert.67  He discusses a number of systems for social coordination; notably the market, 
democratic politics, law and social norms.  His entry point for discussion is through the 
regulatory system, which is seen as cutting across all other systems, and providing a way of 
pointing to the normative issues associated with different systems of authority.68  Like 
Habermas, he rejects Luhmann’s account of indirect communication through ‘cognitive 
openness’ as too restrictive and too far removed from the real world.69  In the context of the 
relationship between regulation and the law, procedure is central, both because of the role of 
procedures within law and their ability to handle uncertainties.70 
Reciprocity characterises the exchange of power and authority between different 
systems.71  It is an essentially communicative process, being ‘about the way in which power 
                                                 
66 N 11 above 152-3, 173. 
67 THE NEW REGULATORY SPACE: REFRAMING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (2014); I also 
benefited considerably from the ‘Author Meets Critics’ session on this book at the 5th European Consortium for 
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68 Ibid 7-8. 
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and authority is exchanged between different systems of social coordination.’72  Reciprocity 
is achieved through regulation, which ‘has moved from providing specific “answers” to 
particular problems, instead becoming the main way in which we reframe democratic 
governance to meet new situations.’73  There is a particularly important role in this for 
constitutions. 
A written constitution is the classic vehicle for trying to maintain the integrity of a 
system of government, for triggering reflection and correction and for trying to 
maintain an overarching coherence ….  However, the changing mix of authority in 
modern systems of social coordination suggests that the idea of a constitution needs to 
be updated if it is to provide effective mechanisms for reflection and correction in a 
modern system of government.  In a contemporary setting, maintaining the oversight 
of boundaries between systems and the integrity of each domain of social 
coordination needs a new and different type of constitution.74 
As this suggests, Vibert’s approach lacks the strongly democratic normative orientation of 
Habermas’s work, but, characteristically for systems theory, is concerned with coping with 
complexity; ‘[i]t is through the regulatory space that modern societies can adjust each of their 
systems of coordination to changing circumstances and bring them into new alignments.’75 
Systems are not self-correcting but require processes of reflection and correction most 
effectively triggered when they interact.76  A key distinction, echoing the different emphases 
of precommitment and of experimentalism discussed above, is that of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
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boundaries between systems.  ‘Hard’ boundaries are those crucial to maintain the core 
functions and values associated with different systems through using heavily legalised rules; 
an example given is that of the constitutionally-protected separation of powers in the United 
States. Here constitutions act as constraints on permissible public actions. ‘Soft’ boundaries, 
by contrast, provide more diffused support, for example through sentiments of what is 
legitimate, and may take the form of soft law.  One example given by Vibert is that of the 
development of greater transparency as a means of fiscal discipline, rather than relying on a 
substantive constitutional amendment, a subject I shall discuss below.  Another way of seeing 
the distinction is to see ‘hard’ constraints as basic constitutional rules to protect core 
functions of a system, whilst ‘soft’ constraints may apply where the costs to the system of a 
particular form of action are unclear.77  ‘Soft’ boundaries will be ‘drawn in large part through 
a process of discretionary judgements by the actors themselves – politicians, regulators and 
judiciaries’, will ‘rest heavily on the supposed advantages of flexibility’, will have a highly 
general normative content and will rely on evolutionary and adaptive learning processes of 
learning and self-correction.78 
For Vibert, constitutions perform the basic functions of providing benchmarks against 
which monitoring can take place and which trigger reflection; they serve a prudential purpose 
of identifying problems which will not be self-correcting; they serve a corrective function 
when actual developments veer off course, and they perform an expressive function of setting 
out basic rules.79  However, traditional constitutions are characterised too much by ‘hard’ 
boundaries which do not properly address the vulnerabilities of the different systems of 
modern societies; there is an echo here of Teubner’s criticism of ordoliberal constitutions 
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with hard constraints to limit government intervention in the economy.  Constitutions thus 
need re-thinking to ‘recognise the diversity of legitimate authority in the modern system of 
government’ and ‘to recognize the need for diverse means of control for monitoring and 
correcting systems.’80  The result will be a more appropriate mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
constraints.  Vibert concludes that: 
[i]n order to ensure the integrity of different systems of authority, there is required some 
kind of updated mechanism for considered reflection, oversight and correction of systems 
of authority. … The idea of a written form of document to protect systems of social 
coordination seems completely archaic in this digital age.  But possibly a new style of 
constitution is indeed the way ahead.81 
 
5. Two failures of constitutional communication 
The argument above, whilst not denying the background role of constitutions as substantive 
constraints on economic management (for example through the protection of basic rights), 
has emphasised the importance of institutional and procedural communication-enhancing 
constraints.  How might these work in practice?   I shall now turn to four brief case-studies; 
the first two will provide examples of failures in organising communicative structures and 
relations through the overuse of substantive constraints and the under-development of 
communicative structures.  
 
5.1 Balancing the budget 
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It may be recalled that an alternative approach to that adopted here is that of constitutional 
economics, to impose substantive precommitment rules constraining the operation of politics 
through constitutional norms, and that a common proposal is that of a balanced budget rule.85 
In this case study I suggest that such ‘hard’ constraints (to use Vibert’s terminology) can have 
seriously dysfunctional consequences, and the study also illustrates a blockage between legal, 
political and economic systems. 
It is tempting to use the US as an illustration of the problems and unintended 
consequences of rules attempting to secure balanced budgets, notably the debt ceiling (not a 
balanced budget rule but a rule with a similar rationale).  In a context of major political 
division, this has been a key contributor to government shutdown and to the loss of the 
USA’s triple-A credit rating, as well as raising difficult constitutional problems.86  However, 
instead I shall choose examples from Europe as part of the prevailing concern to reduce 
governmental deficits and debt in the new millennium by requiring a balanced budget.87  For 
                                                 
85 Buchanan suggests that a balanced budget rules is procedural rather than substantive as does not constrain the 
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example, the German constitution was amended in 2009 to limit the scope for running a 
deficit after 2016; Spain amended its constitution in 2011 to include a deficit limit, a debt 
limit and a limit on spending (only the second constitutional amendment since the return to 
democracy); Italy also amended its constitution during 2012 to require a balance between 
revenues and expenditure.88   The constitutional rules contain exceptions permitting public 
borrowing with parliamentary approval to respond to the economic cycle and to exceptional 
events. 
The most striking example of constitutionalization of such a rule is however at the EU 
level, in the form of the fiscal compact contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance of 2012.  It operates alongside Art 126 and Protocol 12 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union which impose a limit of 3% GDP on the actual or 
planned government deficit. The Member States party to the Treaty also agreed to a fiscal 
compact requiring them achieve a balanced budget; this will be respected if the Stability and 
Growth Plan medium-term national objective is met.  The rules must take effect in national 
law ‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, 
or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budget 
processes’.89   There is, however, an exception to the fiscal rules in the case of an unusual 
event outside the control of the Member State, or periods of severe economic downturn, so 
long as this does not endanger fiscal stability in the medium term.   
The UK is not party to the Treaty and its constitutional arrangements do not permit 
entrenchment of a balanced budget rule, but has also attempted to introduce legal limits on 
                                                 
88 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz), arts 109-15; Constitution of the Spanish 
Republic, art 135; Constitution of the Italian Republic, art 81, amended by Constitutional Law n. 1/2012. 
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deficits.  One example was that of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, which imposed duties 
on the Treasury including that for each financial year up to 2016 public borrowing be 
reduced, halving by 2014, and that public sector debt be put on a downward path by the end 
of the financial year 2015-16.  The Act was short-lived, being repealed by the incoming 
Coalition Government, which replaced it with the requirement under the Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 that the Treasury publish a Charter for Budget 
Responsibility, to be laid before Parliament.90   The Charter includes objectives and a 
mandate for fiscal responsibility and for debt management and debt management reporting, 
and has been amended to reflect changed objectives for deficit reduction.91  However, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer repeatedly failed to meet his objectives for deficit reduction, and 
the target in the Charter of achieving a fiscal surplus by 2020 was unceremoniously dropped 
the week after the UK vote for Brexit in view of the uncertainty the vote had caused. 
It is not hard to identify the purpose of these rules; it was to convince the markets that 
governments are serious about deficit and debt reduction and that this is not at the mercy of 
ordinary politics.  Thus they would be a classic example of a substantive precommitment in 
the sense identified by Elster and discussed earlier.92  However, they were almost completely 
unsuccessful in doing so.  Thus in the EU the constitutional rules were in part an attempt to 
correct deficiencies in the Stability and Growth Pact in its original form, breached by 
Germany and France, which had nevertheless escaped sanctions for political reasons.  
However, draft budgets for 2016 submitted by a number of Member States were criticised as 
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‘making their disdain for the rules obvious’.93  Fines levied by the Commission on Spain and 
Portugal were cancelled by the Council; the Commission has also issued an interpretative 
Communication emphasising the flexibility in the rules.94   Nor did the use of the Fiscal 
Charter in the UK prevent changes in fiscal policy and the eventual abandonment of the 
balanced budget objective in light of changing political events. 
What if the rules had been effective?  Would this have represented a desirable 
substantive precommitment by the European states?  The answer must be negative in this 
case also as they would have constrained legitimate political choices within a financial 
straightjacket and given one controversial and contested approach to fiscal policy a 
constitutionally privileged status.  In the words of the Financial Times, they would have 
created ‘a legalistic hammer to club down politics wherever it raises its unpredictable head’.95   
They would have blocked communication between constitutions and political systems by 
simply outlawing as illegitimate possible choices made by the latter.   There would also have 
been a problem as regards communication with the economic systems of the states which had 
adopted the rules limiting deficits.  As an economic commentator noted in relation to the EU 
rules, ‘nobody knows what the “structural” or cyclically adjusted balance is.  Worse, it is 
least knowable precisely when such knowledge is most essential, namely, when the economy 
is experiencing a boom …. This is one important reason why the Eurozone’s new fiscal 
treaty, which went into effect in January 2013 and is built around achieving a balance in the 
estimated structural fiscal deficit, is most unlikely to work…’.96 
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These ‘hard’ constraints represented by constitutional balanced budget rules did not 
contribute to communication between the legal, economic and political systems but rather the 
reverse.  This is not to say, however, that it is not possible to use constitutional techniques to 
regulate and improve the management of fiscal policy.  In my final case study I shall give 
some examples of how this can be done using techniques closer to Vibert’s ‘soft’ constraints 
through developing countervailing institutions to scrutinise and publicise fiscal decisions.97 
5.2 Regulation and the financial crisis 
The above example concerned the inappropriate use of substantive legal rules.  My second 
example, by contrast, suggests that major problems can arise through unstructured 
procedures; it is not enough simply to have a number of different viewpoints represented in 
the formation of policies without the necessary underlying communicative conditions.  In this 
case only personal relationships and unstructured political channels were available, with 
disastrous results.  This was especially so as the conflicts extended to the legal, political and 
economic systems with limited arrangements for mutual learning.  If the problem with the 
balanced budget rule was too much legal intervention through rules, in this case the problem 
was an absence of structuring by hard or soft law. 
This case is that of the collapse of the UK’s tripartite system of financial services 
regulation during the 2008 financial crisis.98  Despite the political centrality of this type of 
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regulation in ensuring that stability was maintained in the financial system as a whole, it 
provided a classic example of extended government; the key constitutional dimension lies in 
the allocation of responsibilities between different institutions and the structuring of relations 
between them.  The institutions in question were the Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority, the then regulatory body.  Their respective responsibilities were 
set out in a memorandum of understanding and through representation on a Standing 
Committee on Financial Stability chaired by the Treasury.  This might appear to be a 
promising foundation for communication between them, though of course such a 
memorandum could only provide a starting point.  However, the memorandum ‘in fact 
defined the respective roles of the three bodies in terms that reinforced the separateness of 
their operation.’99 
Faced with the financial crisis, the system collapsed.  The problem was described 
vividly by the Chancellor of the time: ‘[t]he whole system depended on the chairman of the 
FSA, the Governor of the Bank and the Chancellor seeing things in exactly the same way.  
The problem was that, in September 2007, we simply did not see things in the same way.’100  
The Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons made a similar point; ‘the biggest 
failings of the Tripartite’s handling of Northern Rock were that it was not clear who was in 
charge, and, because the Tripartite took a minimalist view of their respective responsibilities, 
necessary actions fell between three stools.’101   In this case the absence of both any clear 
allocation of responsibilities between the different institutions, and any forum for 
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collaboration, led to an over-dominance of personal relationships and a failure by the 
institutions involved to face up to their responsibilities. 
How did this represent a failure of communication in the terms set out in this article?  
Two aspects of the events link directly with the theoretical arguments made here.  The first is 
the absence of any form of institutional structuring to ensure rational debate over the 
management of the crisis.  Under traditional UK constitutional doctrine, the ultimate means 
of coordination was for the political constitution through the process of ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament.  However, direct ministerial responsibility was not applicable to 
the operations of the arm’s length Financial Services Authority, let alone to the Bank of 
England.  Thus the political constitution did not structure relations clearly; nor did the legal 
constitution.  The result was that communication came down to ad hoc relations between the 
individual personalities involved and, as mentioned above, they did not have sufficient 
common understandings to found effective cooperation. 
Secondly, the reaction to the crisis was an example of a serious failure of 
communication between the regulatory system and the financial system.  As Vibert has put it, 
…the crisis constituted a failure of the financial system as a whole that is in 
turn a key part of the market system.  The inability of the regulators and governments 
to prevent the crisis could be seen as a failure to understand the nature of the financial 
system, the way risks were transmitted and the way that the connections between 
individual financial enterprises could spiral out of control into a collapse or freezing 
of the system as a whole.102 
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Out of many examples illustrating this last point, one need only look at the Financial 
Services Authority’s report on the handling of the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
finding that the regulator’s handling of systematically important firms was inadequate, and 
that its overall philosophy and approach was flawed.  For example, ‘[t]oo much reliance was 
placed on assessments that appropriate decision-making processes were in place, with 
insufficient challenge to management assumptions and judgements.’ 103 
After the financial crisis, complex measures were taken to try to resolve the problem 
through reforms under the Financial Services Act 2012 and through other administrative 
measures.  They represent a move away from ministerial responsibility towards a complex 
mixture of hard law, soft law, and procedural requirements, for example through a more 
developed use of memoranda of understanding, and institutional reform such as cross-
membership of key committees.104  The use of hard law is the least satisfactory of the 
changes.  It is extremely difficult to navigate due to the Government’s decision to proceed by 
extensive amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 rather than the 
enactment of a new legislative code.  There is also over-complexity in the statutory objectives 
of the new Financial Conduct Authority, which replaces the Financial Services Authority as 
the body responsible for consumer protection and markets regulation.105 
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Institutional reform is more promising.  The provisions go some way to clarifying the 
responsibilities of the different actors, including, for example, a new duty on the Bank of 
England to notify the Treasury of a possible need for public funds such as financial assistance 
to a bank, and a power of direction by the Treasury to the Bank of England to exercise its 
powers of financial assistance, its stabilization powers, or its powers of bank 
administration.106  The Treasury is also empowered to specify to the new Financial Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England what the Government’s economic policy is to be taken to 
be, in a similar form to the annual remit issued by the Chancellor to the Bank’s Monetary 
Policy Committee, to be discussed below.107  Thus provision is in place for the use of soft law 
as a key means of coordination.  There are also enhanced requirements for consultation 
between the Bank of England and the Treasury, and a requirement for meetings with a 
published record between the Governor and the Chancellor after the Bank publishes its 
Financial Stability Report.108  Later legislation has also introduced the power for the Treasury 
to issue published recommendations to the Financial Conduct Authority.109 
These institutional reforms thus require the use of procedural approaches to clarifying 
and structuring the relationships between the institutions, and to that extent represent a useful 
way of improving communication between the different bodies involved in handling a future 
financial crisis. They go further than an experimentalist approach as there is an attempt to 
integrate and coordinate the system and to structure relations between the different bodies so 
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as to provide a coherent response in future by the institutions as a whole.  The system of 
extended government has been accepted (indeed, there are more, rather than fewer, 
institutions involved), but tentative steps have also been taken to structure relations through 
institutional design and the use of soft law, a subject to which I shall return in my final case 
study.  However, much remains to be tested in a future financial crisis, in particular whether 
communication between the bodies involved will survive such a test.  This brings us to the 
next case study, which will suggest a method through which there can be a form of outside 
supervision of the conditions for such communication through the legal constitution. 
6.  Two successes of constitutional communication 
A key theme of my earlier discussion has been that the approach I am advocating goes 
beyond some proceduralist and experimentalist accounts through requiring strong conditions 
to shape the terms of participation and interaction of the different parties involved.  Who will 
draw up and implement these conditions?  There are two possible answers, corresponding to 
the legal and political constitutions referred to earlier.  My next case study will describe a 
process by which the German Federal Constitutional Court required open procedures with the 
effect of integrating the political and legal constitutions.  My final case study will look at 
institutional design and the mix of hard and soft law in similar forms of integration in UK 
monetary and fiscal policy, providing a more evolutionary process of the development of 
communicative institutions. 
6.1. The German Federal Constitutional Court and the legislature 
This study raises two issues.  First, how can communication help integrate rather than 
fragment the institutional arrangements?  Second, how can constraints be created to secure 
compliance with the deliberative conditions specified earlier in this article? 
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The role of the Constitutional Court is dealt with explicitly by Habermas in his 
analysis of the role and legitimacy of constitutional adjudication and, in particular, the 
importance of substantive political rights as pre-requisites for a discursive political 
democratic process.  ‘[T]he constitutional court must examine the contents of disputed norms 
primarily in connection with the communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of 
the legislative process.  Such a procedural understanding of the constitution places the 
problem of legitimating constitutional review in the context of a theory of democracy.’110 
This highly normative approach can be found in recent decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in the context of economic policy; more particularly, of the eurozone 
response to the financial crisis.  Here the Court has, in a series of decisions, actually 
buttressed the political elements in the constitution through requiring effective Parliamentary 
scrutiny of spending decisions as a condition of their constitutionality.111  In the first of these 
cases, on the Euro Rescue Package in 2011, the Court was able to build on its earlier 
decisions strengthening the Bundestag’s powers to resist the limiting effect on its budgetary 
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capacity.112  It considered that the right to vote included not only the right to elections, but 
‘protection against a loss of substance of the Bundestag’s powers, e.g. by transfer to 
international institutions.’113  As the Court put it, ‘[t]he decision on public revenue and public 
expenditure is a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically 
shape itself…’114  Thus it was constitutionally necessary that the legislature make decisions 
on revenue and expenditure free from the imposition of the will of other bodies and that 
‘sufficient parliamentary influence will continue in existence on the manner in which the 
funds made available are dealt with.’115  This implies a deliberative conception of democracy: 
‘parliamentary decisions should be reached after the presentation of alternatives and the free 
deliberation of arguments. … the idea that government has to seek parliamentary approval of 
fundamental decisions because of the higher democratic legitimacy of parliament 
presupposes that the latter shows a certain degree of independence from the former, i.e., that 
it reaches a decision of its own after adequately assessing and discussing different options.’116 
In its decisions on the European Financial Stability Facility and the ESM/Euro Plus 
Pact the Court again emphasised the necessity of the Bundestag’s involvement.117  It also 
decided that the Bundestag’s right to decide the budget and its overall budgetary 
responsibility have to be ‘exercised through deliberation and decision-making in the plenary 
                                                 
112 Parliaments – Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy?, ibid., 307-13. 
113 Parliaments – Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy?, ibid., 313. 
114  Euro Rescue Package decision n 111 above para. 122. 
115  Euro rescue package decision n 111 above para 128. 
116 Parliaments – Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy?, n 111 above 320-1. 
117 See Susanne Schmidt, A Sense of Déja Vu?  The FCC’s Preliminary European Stability Mechanism Verdict, 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1, 10-11 (2013). 
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sitting’ rather than delegated to a committee.118  In its preliminary decision on the European 
Stability Mechanism (which also considered issues arising from the fiscal compact), the 
Court reaffirmed that the Parliament’s budgetary responsibility could not be delegated to the 
executive or to a supranational rescue mechanism.  Moreover, the European Stability 
Mechanism’s provisions on the inviolability of documents and on professional secrecy could 
not prevent comprehensive information being made available to the parliament.  Thus 
[i]f … decisions of the European Stability Mechanism require to be dealt with 
not only at government level, to which the necessary information is always available, 
but also to be discussed and approved in parliamentary bodies, it is absolutely 
necessary for the latter to be informed as well.119 
In essence, then Court was thus providing constitutional protection for the 
Bundestag’s right to deliberation and information through imposing strong norms to channel 
and open the structures for communication between the executive, the legislature and the 
European Union institutions.  A free flow of information and effective deliberation were 
prerequisites for constitutional legitimacy.  This exemplifies the Habermasian concept of 
communication as the basis of democratic discourse; communication within the democratic 
legislature itself is promoted by the Court.  We also see a communicative meta-constitution 
being developed through decisions of the Court devising a division of responsibilities 
between the legislature, the executive and international organisations designed precisely to 
maximise communication in the process of public decision-making.  This exemplifies the 
                                                 
118 Mattias Wendel, Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: the Decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012, 14 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 
21, (2013), 40, referring to the Special Parliamentary Committee case; BVerfG BvE 8/11, Jan 28 2012. 
119 N 111 above para. 225; see Wendel, ibid 37-40 
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concept of ‘soft’ boundaries in Vibert’s analysis, designed to set up relations between the 
legal and political systems, relations which are however flexible enough to cope with new 
outside interventions from international institutions.  However, once more it differs from the 
experimentalist approach in that the Court imposed strong procedural constraints as a 
prerequisite for the legitimate handling of budgetary policy, and the effect was not to 
fragment but to integrate the complex polity of executive, legislature and international 
institutions. 
The German experience is of particular importance in showing how the ‘legal’ and 
‘political’ constitutions may not be rivals but may instead be mutually reinforcing. Moreover, 
though the decision concerned the autonomy of Parliament from international institutions, the 
reasoning is equally applicable to its independence from the executive.  This stands in 
marked contrast to the UK where, in the absence of any such authoritative institution for the 
allocation of constitutional powers other than Parliament, budgetary responsibility has 
effectively been taken into the hands of the executive with only very limited powers of 
scrutiny in advance by Parliament.120  This appears to reveal a weakness in the political 
constitution which remains subject to executive dominance.  However, in my final case study 
I will examine UK developments which may also represent a move towards a more 
communicative model. 
6.2 The UK: Countervailing institutions in monetary and fiscal policy 
The account of constitutional pluralism set out in the first part of this article suggests that the 
‘political’ constitution working through ministerial responsibility, the key means of 
integration and accountability in the UK, will be just as ineffective as substantive legal 
constraints in managing the complexity of plural constitutions.  Ministerial responsibility is 
                                                 
120 See THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, n 98 above, ch 5. 
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essentially monolithic and does not permit the public exchange of information and ideas 
needed to cope with the complexity of modern economic management.  Moreover, such 
management will take place through a wide range of different institutions at national and 
transnational level, many of which will be outside any effective control or even supervision 
by ministers. 
Ministerial responsibility will thus need substantial supplementing by arrangements 
for integration and communication through institutions which are more transparent and 
deliberative and which have a degree of operational independence from government.  These 
are what I shall refer to as countervailing institutions, by which I mean institutions not part of 
a central government department but having sufficient autonomy to permit independent 
implementation or independent scrutiny of public policies.  There may be considerable 
overlap between the responsibilities of different bodies.  These developments form part of 
what John Keane has termed ‘monitory democracy; ‘a new historical form of democracy, a 
variety of “post-parliamentary” politics defined by the rapid growth of many different kinds 
of extra-parliamentary, power-scrutinising mechanisms’ and characterised by 
‘communicative abundance’.121  Recently we have seen the development of such institutions 
in the fields of both monetary and fiscal policy. 
The first example is that of the relationship between the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) and the Treasury.122  Contrary to popular belief, the Bank of 
England Act 1998 does not establish an ‘independent’ committee with sole responsibility for 
setting interest rates.  In fact, statute sets a general framework with overall objectives for the 
MPC of maintaining price stability and, subject to that, supporting the government’s 
                                                 
121 John Keane, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DEMOCRACY, 688, 736-42 (2009). 
122 For discussion THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION, n 98 above ch. 6.  
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economic policy, including its objectives for growth and employment.123  Most important in 
practice is the remit issued annually by the Chancellor, under powers to specify what price 
stability and the Government’s economic policy are to be.124  This remit, which must be 
published, specifies the inflation target, and, especially since 2013, has given advice to the 
Bank on handling trade-offs involved in setting monetary policy, in particular in attempting 
to meet the target whilst supporting growth and attempting to avoid financial imbalances.125  
It is coupled with a system of open letters under which the Governor of the Bank must send a 
letter to the Chancellor, which is published, when the inflation target is missed by more than 
1% (as has been the case recently) explaining the reasons and what action will be taken by 
the Bank.  A fresh letter must be sent every three months; the Chancellor normally responds 
to the open letter with a published letter of his own.126 
Crucially, this allocation of responsibilities is associated with highly developed 
transparency of the system through the early publication of minutes of the MPC’s meetings, 
and detailed regular scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee.  This has enabled far more 
developed Parliamentary consideration to take place than was the case before the 
establishment of the MPC when the main responsibility for interest rates rested with the 
Chancellor.  Thus the Treasury Committee has undertaken regular examinations of the 
MPC’s performance which have been broadly supportive of the arrangements.127  It also 
                                                 
123 Bank of England Act 1998 s. 11. 
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holds pre-appointment hearings in which it examines the professional competence and 
personal independence of proposed appointees to the MPC. 
Of course, the setting of interest rates is a highly specialised area of policy and it 
could be argued that such arrangements are only possible because of this and because of its 
technical nature which does not have a great political or policy content.  However, it has 
increasingly become clear that monetary policy does in practice involve complex and 
controversial trade-offs between different values, notably supporting growth, controlling 
inflation and maintaining financial stability, trade-offs which are now becoming explicitly 
recognised, for example in the Chancellor’s remits from 2013 onwards.   Secondly, it follows 
from this that monetary policy decisions cannot be taken in isolation; they interact closely 
with measures to support growth and to secure financial stability, for example through their 
influence on the mortgage market.  As discussed above, steps have been taken through the 
Financial Services Act 2012 and through administrative changes in the various committees of 
the Bank of England to increase coordination; it remains to be seen how these will cope with 
a future financial crisis. 
Fiscal policy is, of course, highly political and not appropriate for delegation to an 
independent committee.128  However, institutional developments here have also been 
important in facilitating publicity and communication through the creation and development 
of countervailing institutions to scrutinise key elements of fiscal policy, including the success 
or otherwise of deficit reduction.  This is commonplace elsewhere; for example, in France the 
Cour des Comptes, and now the Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques created within it, have 
played a major role in the budgetary process and in advising on matters of public expenditure 
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An important UK example is that of the Office for Budget Responsibility, created by 
the Coalition shortly after the 2010 election and responsible for making independent 
assessments of public finances and of the economy.  Its functions are; preparing and 
publishing the official five-year forecasts for the economy that accompany each budget and 
Autumn Statement which were previously issued by the Treasury; assessing whether the 
Government has more than a 50% chance of meeting its fiscal targets; scrutinising and 
reporting on the Treasury’s assessment of the amount that particular tax and spending 
measures will raise or cost; and analysing and reporting on the health of the public sector 
balance sheet and the long term sustainability of public finances.  The Office was given 
statutory support by the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011; very unusually, 
appointments are subject to veto by the Treasury Committee of Parliament.129  The Office has 
not hesitated to be highly critical of government claims on deficit reduction; it has also 
gained cross-party support with the opposition Labour Party proposing that it audit the 
Party’s fiscal policies before the 2015 general election.  Such an institution offers an 
alternative means to that of substantive balanced budget rules for opening up fiscal policy to 
scrutiny and ensuring that it is taken seriously. 
There are, however, two dangers in the use of institutions of this kind.  The first is that 
of a failure of integration, indeed a further fragmentation of the state, making policy 
coordination impossible and so failing to meet the problems of constitutional pluralism 
outlined in the first part of this article.  This has been in part met though developments in the 
‘administrative constitution’ through the use of soft law; a good example referred to earlier is 
the use of open letters and related procedures to structure relations between the Chancellor 
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and the MPC.  In relation to fiscal policy, examples using both hard and soft law were those 
of the so-called ‘Alignment Project’ attempting to align budgets, estimates and accounts and 
the timing of financial reporting, and the move to resource accounting and budgeting in 
government.130  A further, very important, example is that of the Spending Review process, 
which was designed to allocate funds across government in a way which would facilitate 
achievement of the Government’s deficit reduction objectives through an allocation lasting a 
number of years ahead. 131   Soft law may also avoid the problems associated with the binary 
legal/illegal code which is, according to autopoiesis, characteristic of hard law; soft law as 
guidance is not characterised by such a stark dichotomy.  
The second potential danger is the related one of failure to optimise the level of 
independence from central government of such institutions.  On the one hand, too great a 
level of independence could threaten the integration of institutions just referred to; however, a 
lack of independence could both limit their role in acting as a means of communication 
between different social systems, and could also limit the achievement of credible 
commitment by them.132  The system adopted in the UK meets both these objections through 
a basic specification of the extent of independence and of key objectives through statute with 
a structuring of the discretion by soft law requiring justification through explanation and 
debate. 
Of all the developments discussed in this article, it is the growth of such 
countervailing institutions which comes closest to the experimentalist paradigm referred to 
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above.  However, it would be inaccurate to see them as either fragmenting or destabilising, 
but rather as offering communicative opportunities which may result in a more coherent and 
open body of monetary and fiscal policy decisions.  Indeed, devices such as memoranda of 
responsibility setting out respective spheres of decision-making and cross-membership of 
committees may lead to a greater integration of policy-making and application.  By these 
means it should be possible to move towards the specification of procedures to maximise the 
forms of discourse discussed earlier, and to facilitate communication between law, politics 
and the economy. 
7. Conclusion 
The social theory discussed in this article suggested that communication is a centrally 
important constitutional value for two reasons.  The first is based on democratic grounds, and 
seeks to provide a highly normative commitment to communication as part of inclusive and 
participatory democracy.  The second is more concerned with the design of ‘soft’ boundaries 
between systems so as to permit effective coordination between them and to facilitate coping 
with complexity.  It follows that structured communication, whether between different 
constitutional systems within a pluralist framework or between constitutional and other social 
and economic systems, can offer us a central critical tool for the assessment of our socially 
complex and plural constitutional arrangements.  This is particularly true for economic 
management, which inevitably involves the use of extended government and of multi-level 
government at national and several trans-national levels.  In economic management, the role 
of substantive constraints is likely to be limited (though they will be important in providing 
background rights); instead the most important role will be the creation of communicative 
institutions and procedures through a mix of hard law, soft law and institutional design. 
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Both the theories and the case studies suggest that best approach to constitutional 
design is through a combination of demanding communicative preconditions and flexible and 
pluralist institutions.  This implies that any future study of the constitution and the degree to 
which it meets the communicative demands set out in this article will need to be sociological 
as well as purely legal.  First, I hope to have shown that social theory is useful in setting out 
the basic preconditions for communication, and that these can be applied at a 
metaconstitutional level.  Secondly, it is likely to be the ‘administrative constitution’ which 
moves towards a greater degree of coordination in economic management and, in doing so, 
may start to compensate for the lack of a more authoritative constitutional allocation of 
powers.  Understanding it will involve study of the informal norms of soft law and practice, 
and also the procedural and practical interactions of public institutions.  Though the role of 
the ‘administrative constitution’ is likely to be particularly important in the UK given the 
absence of entrenched constitutional norms, it will also be relevant to other national and 
trans-national systems where economic management involves the myriad interactions of 
dispersed institutions. 
